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Abstract 
Purpose  
The purpose of this paper is to gauge the impact of the following on the share price of a firm that 
has allegedly committed labor abuses: the allegation itself, explanations (justifications and 
excuses) offered by the company spokesperson, and denials of responsibility for the alleged 
abuse.  
Design/methodology/approach  
The study uses archival data and an event study methodology.  
Findings  
Labor abuse allegations have a negative impact on the firm's share price. Allegations that are 
accompanied by an explanation (a justification or excuse) have a less negative impact than those 
that are not accompanied by an explanation. Denials of responsibility have a negative influence 
on the share price.  
Practical implications  
If managers want to avoid a negative hit on the share price from an allegation of wrongdoing, 
they should provide an explanation (a justification or excuse) and avoid the use of denials.  
Originality/value  
Prior research has shown a negative impact from several types of labor abuse. This study extends 
prior research by showing a negative impact for all forms of labor abuse as a general category; it 
also extends findings from lab research on the impact of explanations on fairness judgments to a 
new context and a new dependent variable (the financial performance of the firm), which is on 
an organizational scale. It adds to the extreme paucity of empirical findings relative to the impact 
of denials and also adds to a small but growing literature on fairness judgments by third parties 
and their consequences.  
1.  
Introduction  
Corporations often attempt to influence investor interpretations of their actions through how they 
communicate those actions (Westphal and Zajac, 1998). Organizations may selectively frame 
their use of language to convey preferred meanings to shareholders (Benford and Snow, 2000). 
As Rhee and Fiss (2014) note, selectively framing communications to influence stakeholders is 
especially important when an organization's actions are controversial, where attempts are often 
made to justify such actions in the minds of investors. Investors may interpret information in 
announcements generally associated with negative performance implications in ways that 
mitigate those negative reactions (Muller and Kräussl, 2011). Rhee and Fiss (2014) observed this 
in their study of explanations offered by firms adopting a poison pill. Their findings showed that 
how firms framed language in announced adoption of poison pills affected the stock market 
reaction.  
As noted by Sutton and Galunic (1996), leaders use protective verbal tactics to persuade 
shareholders to continue their support when faced with information that threatens their 
organizations. Skarlicki and Kulik (2005) claim that there is evidence that acts of perceived 
unfairness on the part of managers can negatively impact corporate financial performance, 
however the evidence that Skarlicki and Kulik cite in support of that assertion is anecdotal. The 
importance of information in these statements comes into focus in a study of discrimination 
lawsuits by James and Wooten (2006), who point out that:  
[I]t is not necessarily the lawsuit itself that is most harmful to an organization. Rather, it is the 
firm's response to the lawsuit that can cause the most damage. When a firm's handling of a crisis 
is perceived as fair for the organization, its members, and those harmed in the crisis, the 
consequences of the crisis should be less severe than when a firm is believed to have been 
dishonest, self-serving, or incompetent in resolving a problem. 
In our study, we are concerned with the effect that the presence or absence of explanations and 
denials in news announcements of alleged labor abuses by company spokespeople of publicly 
traded firms will have on the investment decisions of investors, namely, whether to buy, hold, or 
sell the firm's stock. In explaining those phenomena we invoke several theoretical frameworks, 
including organizational justice, corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) (Lange and Washburn, 
2012; Lin-Hi and Muller, 2013), attribution theory, situational crisis communication theory 
(SCCT) (Coombs, 2007), and image restoration theory (Benoit, 1995). We define abusive labor 
practices as acts of discrimination, harassment, and/or unfair compensation.  
One of the theoretical contexts we are considering here is Greenberg's (1987) "organizational 
justice," consisting of fairness judgments made by members of an organization concerning 
actions made and communicated by decision makers. There have been a great many studies of 
fairness judgments made by employees, about their own treatment at the hands of managers. In 
addition to that, some theory has emerged recently on the subject of fairness judgments made by 
third parties (O'Reilly and Aquino, 2011; Skarlicki and Kulik, 2005). O'Reilly and Aquino 
(2011) define third parties as, "those individuals who are neither the direct target of an injustice 
nor the perpetrator of the act" (p. 256). That is, third parties make judgments, including fairness 
judgments, about the alleged harm-doer's treatment of the victim and, in the case of investors, 
collectively have the power either to reinforce or to punish the harm-doer's behavior. Among the 
examples given of third parties by O'Reilly and Aquino (2011) and Skarlicki and Kulik (2005) 
are investors, which is our focus. To our knowledge, no other study beyond the present one has 
looked at investors' judgments as third parties.  
Another set of the theoretical contexts we are invoking here is the literature in communications 
on crisis management, though our focus is not on full-blown crises but on potential crises. Our 
emphasis is on crisis prevention, which Coombs (2009) asserts is an understudied phenomenon. 
So our focus is on potential harm to the organization's reputation and its financial performance 
brought about by issues (Coombs and Holladay, 2012) or problems (Coombs, 2002) that have the 
capacity to be transformed into legal crises such as class action lawsuits.  
To measure the effects of third party assessments of alleged labor abuses on a firm's financial 
performance, we used the event study method. In event studies the "events" are unexpected 
announcements made by a firm. Event studies have spawned a rich body of research that 
examines how investors assess the financial impact of firm-specific events (Lubatkin and 
Shrieves, 1986). When the information contained in an announcement signals to investors a 
positive (negative) change in expected future cash flows, there will be a positive (negative) effect 
on share price (Brown and Warner, 1985). A firm's stock price captures all expected future cash 
flows, discounted for risk and time, that are expected to accrue to the shareholder (Rappaport, 
1997). Stock price is often used as a proxy for a firm's financial performance in that it reflects the 
economic value enjoyed by a shareholder owning shares of a firm, i.e., shareholder value. The 
event study method is relevant to our study because it allows us to test what effect unexpected 
announcements of alleged abusive labor practices might have on how investors as third parties 
evaluate the impact of these practices on shareholder value. Consistent with our focus in this 
paper, some event studies have examined firm-specific events involving labor-friendly and -
unfriendly corporate practices (e.g. Arthur, 2003; Hannon and Milkovich, 1996; Hersch, 1991; 
Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 2006). To our knowledge, ours is one of the first studies to 
examine the dynamics of third party judgments in a real setting. We believe it is the first to 
consider the effects of explanations and denials on the financial performance of a company.  
2.  
Hypotheses  
2.1  
Main effect of alleged labor abuses on stock returns  
The Anglo-American model of corporate governance is characterized by dispersed ownership 
and emphasizes short-term returns, well-protected shareholder rights, arms-length creditor 
financing, and active markets for organizational control (Aguilera, 2005). In their theory of the 
conditions that spawn corporate social responsibility (CSR), Aguilera et al. (2007) argue that, 
even within the Anglo-American model, investors are motivated to push for greater CSR 
because, if a firm's reputation is damaged, that damage has implications for that firm's 
competitiveness. In addition, a meta-analysis by Orlitzky et al. (2003) clearly shows that CSR is 
associated with enhanced financial performance. In particular, institutional investors typically 
have large investments in a corporation and thus cannot move in and out of ownership as readily 
as individual investors can (Aguilera et al. , 2007). Therefore, institutional investors are more apt 
to try to actively influence the firm's level of CSR as opposed to selling their holdings in order to 
avoid a short-term loss. Additional motives for investors include pre-empting negative publicity, 
avoiding disinvestment by others, and not incurring penalties associated with non-compliance. 
Protecting the legitimacy of the firm can be seen as a motive for investors to encourage a firm to 
engage in CSR-enhancing activities (Aguilera et al. , 2007) and, by extension, to avoid activities 
that can be labeled as socially irresponsible. While the emphasis in CSR research is on "doing 
good," CSI (Lange and Washburn, 2012) focuses on "avoiding doing bad."  
Attribution theory, which originated in research on person perception, has been extended to 
perceptions of organizations' behavior as well (Lange and Washburn, 2012). The basic premise 
of the theory is that there is an imbalance between the cognitive processing that observers do in 
response to negative events as opposed to positive ones. People spend more time thinking about 
negative, as opposed to positive, events. They will look more extensively for causal information 
and their resulting actions and allegations will be more extreme (Fiske and Taylor, 2008). 
"People," Shaver (1985) observes, "are never blamed for doing good" (p. 3). Along with the 
theory comes the notion that such judgments as to the causes of human and organization 
behavior are changeable. In communications, SCCT (Coombs, 2007; see also Coombs, 2012, for 
a review) is derived from attribution theory.  
CSR is proactive and prosocial, acting with regard to future concerns and aimed at avoiding an 
expectations gap between the organization and its stakeholders (Coombs and Holladay, 2012). In 
contrast to the voluminous literature on CSR, less than a handful of conceptual articles on CSI 
have appeared in recent years (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Lin-Hi and Muller, 2013). Only one 
empirical study has been reported on CSI, an event study by Groening and Kanuri (2013).  
There is some evidence which suggests that investor responses to labor abuse allegations may be 
motivated by perceptions of unfairness. Public pension funds, labor funds, and socially 
responsible investment (SRI) funds emphasize longer term stakeholder interests by investing in 
firms that, among other things, have high labor standards (Aguilera et al. , 2007). Pension fund 
activists such as CalPERS (which manages the retirement funds for active California state 
employees and retirees) vigorously and publicly screen out firms that are liable to incur brand 
damage and/or deterioration of the firm's reputation due to deficits in CSR (Clark and Hebb, 
2004). SRIs in particular are concerned with the social and environmental performance of firms 
(Lydenberg, 2005).  
So we see that fairness may motivate investor decisions in addition to the traditional emphasis on 
financial performance. Despite those arguments we believe that investors' primary motivation is 
financial. Lamin and Zaheer (2012) did two studies side by side, one a survey of the general 
public and the other an event study of investors. Both groups responded to reports of overseas 
sweatshop conditions among the subcontractors of American companies. Lamin and Zaheer 
found that the general public is motivated primarily by fairness concerns whereas investor 
judgments were unaffected by the negative information. They concluded that investors are 
motivated primarily by financial concerns. Unlike our sample, that of Lamin and Zaheer 
responded to labor abuse allegations that were not punishable under US law. Their sample of 
investors was not convinced on purely moral grounds to take action against the companies in 
question. Thus, Lamin and Zaheer concluded what has long been held on Wall Street as a truth, 
that investors are primarily motivated by financial concerns. We concur with that assessment. 
Ours is a sample of domestic cases that were apparently headed for adjudication in most cases by 
US courts. It is our view that the investors in our sample would take a negative view of the 
allegations because of the potential costs associated with litigation (James and Wooten, 2006; 
Jang and Chen, 2009).  
Contingency theory of public relations, a grand theory which makes prescriptive 
recommendations, predicts that threats to an organization's reputation that originate internally 
(such as the accusations we are studying) and that are long term in nature (some in our sample, 
such as Wal Mart, face recurring allegations) should involve the pursuit of an accommodative 
strategy (e.g. apologies) by the spokesperson. Investors may well have recognized that on a naïve 
level.  
Much prior research has shown that shareholders pay attention to publicly announced 
information communicated about firms' CSR activities. Drawing from such information, 
shareholders may change their assessments of the future prospects of a firm. In the case of 
publicly announced information considered to be socially irresponsible, such as allegations of 
abusive labor practices, investors are likely to anticipate that firms will incur financial costs and 
a decline in future cash flows. Most obvious among financial costs are those associated with the 
costs of a lawsuit, including legal defense, legal fees, and back pay with the loss of a lawsuit or 
an out-of-court settlement (Bradford, 2004; James and Wooten, 2006). Initial lawsuits can trigger 
subsequent lawsuits, resulting in additional costs that further decrease the firm's cash flow and, 
therefore, the stock price (Bhagat et al. , 1998). Moreover, investors are likely to perceive a 
decline in cash flows due to decreased productivity of managers while handling the lawsuit 
(Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 2006). In the aftermath of abusive labor practices a firm may also 
incur significant financial costs in making changes to organizational policies and structures that 
safeguard against abusive practices (Terpstra and Kethley, 2002).  
Publicly announced information concerning a firm's socially irresponsible behavior also exposes 
the firm to potentially damaging reputation costs, especially in cases involving discrimination 
(James and Wooten, 2006; Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 2006). Customer stakeholders take 
note of discriminatory practices and may boycott a firm's products (Pruitt and Nethercutt, 2002). 
The reputational penalty of a discrimination lawsuit may make it difficult and costly for a firm to 
attract and hold onto good employees (Karpoff and Lott, 1993). Within firms practicing 
discrimination, one is likely to see higher absenteeism, turnover, and job dissatisfaction, as well 
as diminished support from communities and institutions (Bradford, 2004). Like financial costs, 
reputational costs will signal to investors a rise in cost structures and a decrease in future cash 
flows.  
Some empirical studies provide evidence of a relationship between specific types of abusive 
labor practice and stock returns. Epstein and Schnietz (2002) found that investors drove down 
the value of stock more for firms in industries perceived as labor-abusive than for firms in 
industries not perceived as labor-abusive following the announcement of failure of the 1999 
World Trade Organization talks. An event study by Rock (2003) showed that announcements of 
firms engaged in sweatshop practices were associated with a statistically significant decline in 
the stock value of these firms. Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (2006) found that announcements of 
age discrimination practices significantly reduced stock prices. McMillan-Capehart et al. (2010) 
reported significant increases in stock price in the days following a firm being named to 
DiversityInc.'s list of firms recognized for their diversity management. Lastly, a study by Wright 
et al. (1995), compared stock returns following announcements of firms receiving US 
Department of Labor Awards for exemplary affirmative action programs with announcements of 
damage awards paid out by firms to settle anti-discrimination lawsuits. Their findings show 
significantly positive returns for the former and significantly negative returns for the latter.  
The evidence above suggests that in specific forms of abusive labor practices, most notably 
discrimination, shareholders will perceive a rise in financial and reputational costs that diminish 
the firm's future cash flows. However, in addition to acts of discrimination, abusive labor 
practices also include harassment and unfair compensation. Because these practices are regarded 
as socially irresponsible and cause firms to incur financial and reputational costs, we would 
expect investors to regard announcement of all abusive labor practices as detrimental to the 
firm's value. Accordingly: H1.  
The announcement of an abusive labor practice will be associated with a negative stock price 
reaction.  
2.2  
Effects of explanations  
Explanations given by company spokespeople can address the responsibility for alleged labor 
abuses in several ways (Bies, 1987; Schlenker, 1980; Sitkin and Bies, 1993). Sometimes 
justifications are used in conjunction with acknowledgments of responsibility. Exonerating and 
reframing accounts are examples of justifications. Exonerating accounts acknowledge 
responsibility but try to justify the actions in question as driven by some norm, value, or ideology 
of greater importance than the expectation that has been violated (Sitkin and Bies, 1993). 
Companies also acknowledge responsibility but try to justify their actions by reframing the 
alleged wrongdoing. In using reframing accounts, the company communicates that it has 
minimized the harm created by comparing it to a worse harm that would have resulted from 
some alternative action (Sitkin and Bies, 1993). A third way that companies justify their alleged 
wrongdoing is to offer excuses - also known as mitigating or causal accounts. With mitigating 
accounts, the alleged harm-doer communicates a reason for the action and thereby implies or 
asserts that the organization had no choice but to act as it did (Sitkin and Bies, 1993), which 
should reduce the amount of blame that is placed on the shoulders of the organization and the 
people who speak for it. A consideration that is relevant here is that, when company 
spokespersons decide how to respond to an alleged labor abuse, they understand that their 
communication is going out to numerous audiences at once, namely, employees, investors, 
consumers, and the general public. Spokespersons likely understand that the "spin" that they put 
on their response can influence, not only investor behavior, but the future behavior of employees 
as well. They are likely going to try to deter employees from filing future lawsuits. The messages 
that are meant to mollify employees may alienate consumers and, via the anticipation of the 
stock market of consumer reaction, may alienate investors as well. Consumers often transmit 
messages about a company via word-of-mouth, which is a very difficult channel to erase later 
(Coombs, 2007). Coombs (2012) points out that improper crisis management practices can do 
more harm than good to an organization's reputation.  
A somewhat different approach used by companies is to deny responsibility for alleged abusive 
labor practices. By denying that any harm occurred in the first place, or claiming that the 
allegations have no legitimate basis, a spokesperson might seek to avoid any issues of 
responsibility altogether (Schlenker, 1980)[1]. In stark contrast to explanations in which a 
company communicates denial is the penitential account (Bies, 1987; Schlenker, 1980). 
Penitential accounts are simply apologies. Apologies are an accommodative approach to crisis 
management, what Benoit (1995) refers to in image restoration theory as "mortification 
strategies." With regard to CSR and CSI, apologies serve to re-align the expectations of the 
organization and its stakeholders (Coombs and Holladay, 2012). With respect to issues 
management, apologies can bring about organizational change if the corporation agrees as part of 
the apology not to repeat the violation in the future (Coombs and Holladay, 2008). In that way, 
apologies can prevent a crisis (Coombs, 2012). Attorneys generally advise their clients not to 
apologize because it communicates an unambiguous admission of guilt (Cohen, 1999; Coombs 
and Holladay, 2008; Tyler, 1997).  
There is a rich literature on the effects of explanations on perceptions of wrongdoing (see 
Bobocel and Zdaniuk, 2005, for a review). Most such studies were laboratory and critical 
incidents studies performed by Bies, Folger, and their colleagues in the 1980s that looked at the 
effects of excuses (again, mitigating accounts) and justifications (again, exonerating and 
reframing accounts) on the fairness judgments of persons directly affected by the act in question 
(Bies and Moag, 1986; Bies and Shapiro, 1987, 1988; Bies et al. , 1988; Folger and Martin, 
1986; Folger et al. , 1983). In a few instances, the fairness judgments that were examined looked 
at third parties as the source of those judgments, i.e., members of the general public who read 
about layoffs in a company with which they have no direct association (Bobocel and Debeyer, 
1998; Skarlicki et al. , 1998). In any case, the research showed that all types of explanations 
tested had an effect on perceptions of wrongdoing. Justifications, excuses, and apologies are all 
instances of "offensiveness strategies" in the communications literature (Coombs, 2015). 
Coombs points out that such strategies are seldom used by corporations. We are making the 
argument that they should be used more often.  
The motives behind third party judgments can be moral (motivated by the perception of 
injustice), instrumental (motivated by concern for one's own outcomes), or both (O'Reilly and 
Aquino, 2011; Skarlicki and Kulik, 2005). In the case of investors as third parties, their 
judgments regarding the firm's treatment of its employees can be moral (i.e. concerned with the 
employees' welfare), instrumental (concerned about the potential financial losses attending a 
lawsuit, a regulatory fine, a boycott, or a strike), or relational (concerned with the legitimacy of 
the firm) (Aguilera et al. , 2007). With an instrumental response, investors can decide to sell their 
interest in a company that is accused of widespread discrimination simply because they are 
concerned about the potential effects, for example, of a class action lawsuit on the value of their 
holdings. There, investors are anticipating a moral judgment by a different third party (e.g. a 
judge, a jury, or a regulatory agency), which may act to punish the alleged harm-doer.  
Because shareholders have considerable corporate power, they will take decisive action if they 
believe that management is following policies that do not maximize stock value. A decline in 
stock value in immediate response to an announced abusive labor practice may lead to managers 
losing their jobs, which may have a greater negative impact than the costs imposed through the 
courts and regulatory agencies (Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 2006). Accordingly, offering 
justifications may act to reduce the likelihood that managers will lose their jobs: H2.  
Justifications and excuses given by a company spokesperson to explain accusations of abusive 
labor practices will result in a less negative value for the company's stock price.  
Instead of trying to explain alleged abusive practices, firms may deny that the allegation has 
merit and/or claim that it is totally lacking in validity. Denials have received very little research 
attention in the literature on social psychology and management, although they are mentioned in 
passing by Schlenker (1980). When a denial is issued by a company spokesperson, that is likely 
to be seen as an attempt by management to escalate the conflict with their employees by 
employing a forcing strategy that poisons the relationship between employer and employees 
(Thomas, 1976), such a "digging in of the heels" is likely to be seen by employees and investors 
alike as a declaration of war, an instance of escalation of commitment, in which a party to a 
conflict persists in a course of action that is inadvisable (see Ross and Staw, 1993). In the legal 
context, there are numerous potential consequences of using denials as a strategy when investors 
are the audience (see James and Wooten, 2006; Jang and Chen, 2009). It gives off the indication 
of the case going to litigation if the employee(s) does not/do not back down. Whatever the legal 
outcome, litigation involves tremendous uncertainty and impacts indirect costs, including 
management distraction and difficulty obtaining credit on favorable terms. Investors likely 
recognize that and factor those considerations into their assessment of the firm's value. Coombs 
and Holladay (2012) recommend that CSR involve collaboration with employees as 
stakeholders. We see no reason why that would not apply to CSI as well. Denial is stonewalling - 
the opposite of collaboration. As Jang and Chen (2009) point out:  
The legal liability incurred by an organization diminishes with increased use of defensive 
strategies [such as denials] [...] but this approach suggests denial of responsibility, corporate 
arrogance, and inappropriate defensiveness and may ultimately increase negative public 
perceptions of the organization.  
Another reason why denials do not work comes from Coombs (2014), who, in discussing SCCT, 
recommends that if there is some, even minimal responsibility, the organization's spokespeople 
should take a more victim-centered approach. Denials work if the organization is truly not 
responsible for a crisis. However, we believe that investors know that, in the corporate world the 
truth will eventually get out (Coombs and Holladay, 2012). Stakeholders want organizations to 
take responsibility (Coombs, 2014). If the organization denies responsibility and it is later 
discovered that it is culpable, matters will get even worse for the corporation.  
As alluded to above, legal scholars typically recommend denials in an effort to avoid an 
admission of responsibility, which may open the firm up to legal liability (Cohen, 1999; Coombs 
and Holladay, 2008; Tyler, 1997). However, the admission of responsibility for an alleged harm 
by a company spokesperson has been shown to have benefits for the firm, including positive 
evaluations of character (Schlenker and Darby, 1981), enhanced trust in the organization 
(Tomilson et al. , 2004), enhanced perceptions of organizational integrity (Ferrin et al. , 2007), 
and more positive views of the organization's reputation (Lyon and Cameron, 2004) - all benefits 
that are foregone when spokespersons employ denials. In addition, a denial may be interpreted 
by the employees in question as an insult, implying that they are liars in making the accusation in 
the first place and constituting a breach of interactional justice, which includes the quality of the 
interpersonal treatment affecting employees and likely noticed by investors as third parties. We 
believe therefore that denials will have a negative effect on the stock price even though such 
assertions may help to protect the firm from legal liability: H3.  
Denials of company wrongdoing given by a company spokesperson in response to accusations of 
abusive labor practices will have a negative effect on the company's stock price.  
3.  
Sample  
We collected data on announced alleged abusive labor practices in press releases between 1990 
and 2009 found in PR Newswire and Business Wire in the LexisNexis database. The event date 
was the date of the first reported press release. In some cases, press releases appeared once or 
twice in a period that extended to a maximum of three days following the initial announcement. 
All subsequent announcements, however, were either repeated or excerpted versions of the first 
announcement. This is to say that subsequent announcements contained no new information 
regarding the announced alleged abusive labor practice.  
It is important to note here that all data for the study were drawn from archival sources. Archival 
sources are nonreactive in the sense that the measures are made unbeknown to the people who 
are producing those measures and thus they do not respond to the act of being subjected to 
measurement as they are likely to in a laboratory study or a survey questionnaire (Webb et al. , 
1981). Because our independent, dependent, and control measures are drawn from different 
archives, they are not subject to common method variance. To our knowledge, very few if any 
organizational justice studies have been performed using wholly archival measures.  
Following prior event studies, we eliminated announcements made by firms that conveyed 
potentially confounding corporate news that may also affect investors' reactions (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). Such confounding events include simultaneous announcements such as 
mergers and acquisitions, executive management changes, stock splits and repurchases, 
divestitures, earnings and dividend announcements, and new product introductions. After 
eliminating 44 potentially confounding events, our final sample contained 243 announcements 
made by 119 firms. In addition, there were no apologies given by any firm in the sample, which 
is why we do not include a justification for any hypotheses involving apologies in this report.  
Two of the study's authors then independently read announcements and identified those which 
contained excuse/justification accounts and those which contained denial accounts. Agreement in 
identifying announcements containing explanations was 94 percent, suggesting high inter-
reviewer reliability. Differences in reviews were discussed and resolved. Table I shows excerpts 
of explanations from announcements for each category.  
4.  
Methodology  
4.1  
Dependent variable and the event study method  
Our dependent variable is the firm-specific unexpected change in stock value associated with the 
announcement of an alleged abusive labor practice event. The event has an effect on the firm's 
financial performance if it results in an abnormal movement in the price of the firm's stock. As 
mentioned earlier, we use the event study method to test whether this abnormal movement in 
stock value, or "abnormal return (AR)," has a significant impact on a firm's financial 
performance. The AR is the actual ex post return of the stock following the event minus the 
expected normal return of the stock during the same time period as if the event had never been 
announced.  
To estimate ARs, we used Cowan's Eventus software and the Center for Research in Security 
Prices database for stock prices and returns. As a first step in conducting the event study we 
estimated the expected normal return of a given stock using the Fama-French-momentum model 
(Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 1993, 1996)[2]. We then calculated ARs as the difference 
between the expected and actual value of the stock measured as a percentage. ARs were 
calculated for the event date ( t 0 ), which is the first public release date of the information, and 
also for individual days before and after the event. Following standard practice in event studies 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), we summed ARs over a number of days before and after the 
event to derive a measure of the cumulative ARs (CARs) for each event. For example, an event 
window for CARs might run from two days before the event day to two days after the event day 
( t -2 -t +2 ). In this manner, it was possible to determine if and when an alleged abusive labor 
event had an impact on a firm's stock. We chose for our event window the 11-day period 
beginning five days before the announcement and ending five days after the announcement ( t -5 -
t +5 ). Event windows that cover several days have been widely used in studying stock market 
reactions to capture potential leakage of information prior to the event and slow responses or 
reevaluations after the first public announcement of the event (Bindu and Zhang, 2009; 
Chatterjee et al. , 1992; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Srinivasan and Bharadwaj, 2004). 
Accordingly, by choosing an 11-day event window, we were able to determine the stock market 
reaction on the day of the announcement and for cumulative periods before and after the 
announcement. We also report results for windows from t 0 to t 10 and t 0 to t 15 to test if CARs 
persist beyond day five.  
4.2  
Analysis  
To test H1 , we first conducted an event study to determine the ARs and CARs over the 11-day 
event window. We followed prior event studies in using the parametric standardized cross-
sectional Z -statistic to show if ARs and CARs are statistically significant, and the nonparametric 
generalized sign Z -statistic to test the significance of the proportion of positive ARs and CARs 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Srinivasan and Bharadwaj, 2004). The cross-sectional Z -statistic 
adjusts for serial dependence (Mikkelson and Partch, 1988) and for a possible increase in 
variance around the event date (Boehmer et al. , 1991). To test H2 and H3 , regarding the effects 
of explanations and denials, we used t -tests to evaluate mean differences in ARs and CARs 
between firms that used explanations and denials and those that did not. Since the independent 
variables (the explanations and denials) are drawn from individual responses made by company 
spokespeople and dependent measures are drawn from stock market results, the study qualifies as 
a cross-level study (see House et al. , 1995).  
5.  
Results  
Table II reports summary statistics and correlation coefficients for variables used in the analyses.  
5.1  
The effect of alleged abusive labor practices on equity returns  
Table III contains the results for the market response to all announcements of alleged abusive 
labor practices. These results indicate an immediate market response to announcements. On the 
day preceding the event, 45.7 percent of firms had positive ARs. That number declines to 42.4 
percent on the event day. In support of H1 , we observe a significant negative AR of -0.24 
percent on the event day (p <0.05). The median AR is -0.29 percent. Following Karpoff et al. 
(2008), we calculate the dollar value effect by multiplying each firm's AR on the event day (t 0 ) 
by the firm's market capitalization one day before the announcement. The mean and median 
dollar losses are $138.43 and $18.44 million, respectively. The total dollar loss summed over all 
firms is $33.64 billion.  
5.2  
The effect of explanations on equity returns  
Table IV presents the results from comparing the market response to announcements that do and 
do not contain excuse/justification accounts. In support of H2 , we find that investor reaction was 
significantly less negative for announcements offering these accounts than for those that did not. 
Event window t 0 -t +2 is significant at p <0.05 (t =-1.913), event window t 0 -t +3 is significant at 
p <0.001 (t =-3.543), and t 0 -t +4 and t 0 -t +5 are both significant at p <0.01 (t =-2.931 and t =-
2.773, respectively). The results suggest that investors delayed their upward revision of stock 
value for a period covering days 0-2 through 0-5 after announcements communicating 
excuse/justification accounts for alleged abusive labor practices.  
Table IV also shows the market response to announcements that denied alleged labor abuse 
practices. Supporting H3 , we find that investors reacted more negatively to announcements in 
which firms denied alleged abusive labor practices than to announcements without denial 
accounts. Event windows t 0 -t +1 and t 0 -t +2 are both significant at p <0.05 (t =1.833 and t 
=2.138, respectively), t 0 -t +3 is significant at p <0.01 (t =2.547), and t 0 -t +4 and t 0 -t +5 are both 
significant at p <0.05 (t =2.011 and t =1.689, respectively). Accordingly, we see that investors 
delayed their downward revision of stock value for a period covering days 0-1 through 0-5 after 
the initial announcement made by firms that denied alleged abusive labor practices.  
Further support for H2 and H3 appears in the third row block in Table IV. These results show 
that investor reaction was significantly more negative for announcements that denied 
wrongdoing than for announcements with excuse/justification accounts. Event window t 0 to t +1 
is significant at p <0.05 (t =-1.957), t 0 -t +2 is significant at p <0.01 (t =-2.452), t 0 -t +3 is 
significant at p <0.001 (t =-3.960), and t 0 -t +4 , and t 0 -t +5 are both significant at p <0.01 (t =-
2.912 and t =-2.848, respectively).  
5.3  
Cross-sectional analysis  
Results in Table IV do not control for other factors that could influence the market's response to 
announcements of abusive labor practices. We therefore include a multivariate regression as a 
more robust test that controls for other cross-sectional differences that may impact the 
information effect on the market reaction:  
 
CARi=[beta]0+[beta]1ExplanationsiorDenialsi+[beta]2ROAi+[beta]3MVEi+[beta]4Multiplei+I
µi  
  
where for each announcement i , the dependent variable is the CARs. We run the regression for 
the same event windows and independent variables (Explanations or Denials ) as reported above. 
Our control variables are return on assets (ROA ), log of market value of equity (MVE ), and 
whether firms in our sample had more than one announced abusive labor practice (Multiple ). We 
include ROA to account for the possibility that the market might act differentially according to 
the firm's performance. More profitable firms receive more positive media coverage, whereas 
less profitable firms receive more negative media coverage (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012). Ursel and 
Armstrong-Stassen (2006) report that opportunities for age discrimination charges increase in 
firms that face financial difficulties. MVE controls for how investors might consider the size of 
the firm in evaluating the impact of an abusive labor practice[3]. Larger firms often get more 
media coverage and may experience a weaker performance effect following an accusation 
(Lamin and Zaheer, 2012). A firm's size likely relates positively to observer assessments of 
corporate culpability (Lange and Washburn, 2012). Larger firms, for instance, typically pay 
higher punitive and compensatory damages than small firms in discrimination lawsuits 
(Bradford, 2004). The variable Multiple controls for potential differences in how investors might 
react to announcements for firms that have had more than one announced abusive labor practice. 
As Coombs (2007) suggests, firms with a history of reputational damage from a crisis are likely 
to suffer greater reputational damage in a successive similar crises than firms that have not 
experienced a similar prior crisis.  
Table V presents the results of the regression analysis for cumulative event windows from days t 
0 to t +2 through t 0 to t +5 and shows that they are consistent with the t -test results. We also find 
that higher pre-event returns on assets are significantly related to CARs for several windows, 
suggesting that investors may react more strongly to alleged abusive labor practices in higher 
performing firms. Firm size and multiple announcements appear to have little impact on the 
market's reaction.  
6.  
Discussion and conclusion  
In this paper, we suggest that investors, as third parties to an alleged wrongdoing, tend to avoid 
investing in companies that are alleged to have committed labor abuses. Further, we argue that 
this negative effect is offset somewhat when company spokespeople communicate excuses and 
justifications as explanations for the event. We also suggest a negative effect occurs when 
company spokespeople offer denials as explanations for the event.  
Our results strongly support these hypotheses. First, as predicted, investors, who are neither the 
direct target of an abusive labor practice nor the perpetrator of the act, react negatively to the 
harm-doer's behavior by adversely influencing the firm's stock value.  
Second, our prediction also held for how investors as third parties react to announcements that 
communicated explanations containing excuses and justifications for an alleged abusive labor 
practice. In using these accounts, company spokespersons appear to have allayed some of 
investors' initial concerns about the consequences for the firm, substantially upgrading the firm's 
stock value. The response, however, is not immediate as investors appear to need additional time 
to reconsider and revise their initial response. While we cannot fully explain why this may be, 
the market in some cases may require more time to absorb the effects of an event (Oler et al. , 
2008). Investors' responses at the time of an announcement may be incomplete when events 
disclose more complex information (Dumay and Tull, 2007). This appears to be the case in 
announcements that contain explanations. As McMillan-Capehart et al. (2010) report, 
announcements that positively affect a firm's reputation may take longer for investors as third 
parties to recognize fully.  
Third, as hypothesized, our findings show that announcements in which company spokespeople 
offered denials as explanations for the event were associated with a decline in stock value. Our 
findings are consistent with those of Lamin and Zaheer (2012), indicating that the investor's 
primary motivation in the majority of cases is instrumental, i.e., they are primarily concerned 
about the potential effects of litigation on future cash flows. In other words, our findings pertain 
more closely to instrumental models of third party judgments (see Skarlicki and Kulik, 2005) 
rather than to moral or fairness-related models of such judgments (see O'Reilly and Aquino, 
2011).  
As in explanations containing excuses and justifications, the market response is delayed by 
several days. Here too, investors may need additional time to reconsider and revise their initial 
response.  
6.1  
Implications for theory  
We note at least three important contributions of our study: it adds to the very small number of 
empirical studies on third party behavior; it adds to research on explanations a new dependent 
variable on a new, organizational scale - the effects on the financial performance of the 
company; and it adds to our understanding of the role that denials play when a third party 
considers an allegation of harm-doing.  
Aguilera et al. (2007) advance a multi-level theory which identifies the actors who are pushing 
an organization to become more socially responsible and their motives for doing so. Aguilera et 
al. would characterize the alleged labor abuses in our study as CSI and the type of social change 
that is sought in those events to be reactive rather than proactive. Like our study, their theory 
analyzes behavior at the individual (in our sample, company spokespersons) and organizational 
levels. They rely on the organizational justice literature in deriving motives for CSR (namely, 
instrumental, relational, and moral motives). Our study therefore functions as a test of the 
Aguilera et al. (2007) multi-level theory. Our use of data on the use of explanations and of 
changes in stock price as a dependent variable answers Aguilera et al. 's call for using specific, 
measurable behaviors relative to CSR and the conditions which give rise to it, since CSR and 
CSI taken together are such broad subjects.  
6.2  
Implications for practice  
If a corporate spokesperson wishes to "cushion the blow" of an alleged labor abuse, or of a 
similar instance of bad news for the firm, he or she is recommended to pursue the following 
guidelines: the spokesperson should employ excuses and justifications while avoiding issuing 
denials. The usage of the word "excuse" is not pejorative here; an excuse is simply a reason 
communicated by way of explanation. In lieu of a denial, the spokesperson might say that the 
organization is investigating the situation or is cooperating with an external investigation. 
Denials communicate defensiveness and investors may wonder in the face of a vociferous denial 
that, to paraphrase Shakespeare, perhaps the spokesperson doth protest too much. As mentioned 
above, a denial may further anger the complainants in the situation, since a strong denial sends 
the message that those complainants are lying. In instigating or cooperating with an 
investigation, the firm is communicating that it has nothing to hide.  
6.3  
Limitations, strengths, and future research  
One limitation of our study is that an 11-day window increased the chance that other, unreported, 
confounding events occurred. However, because we eliminated confounding events to the best of 
our ability and given the significance of our findings, we feel confident that the results are an 
accurate representation of third party responses to explanations. Another possible limitation is 
that there are a variety of factors that may influence the effectiveness of explanations which we 
were unable to measure, given our focus on secondary data sources. Examples include perceived 
sincerity of the deliverer, context, outcome favorability/importance/severity, and informational 
uncertainty (for a review, see Bies, 2013).  
A methodological strength of our study is that, since our measures were archival, our subjects 
did not react to the fact that their behavior was being measured. In addition, there was no 
common method variance in those measures as well. Our study does not remove the need for 
laboratory and field research on explanations and third party effects. Instead, all three types of 
research are needed and the results of all three should be interpreted alongside one another so 
that the weaknesses of each method can be offset by the strengths of the others.  
With respect to future research, one direction would be to try and measure the mediating and 
moderating variables that intervene in the context of investor judgments. For example, a single 
allegation of labor abuse could be examined in a single company. That event could be presented 
as a real or hypothetical situation to a group of investors, both present and prospective 
shareholders, and judgments of investors as third parties could be measured by a survey method. 
In this way, if fairness considerations are truly involved, fairness judgments would be measured, 
not inferred as they are in the present study. The resulting research would not make use of the 
event study methodology, but could make use of multiple, other methodologies such as a policy-
capturing method (a sort of hybrid between a laboratory study and a survey questionnaire) and 
interviews with investors. By such means, researchers can also measure variables as prospective 
moderators, variables mentioned above like perceived sincerity of the deliverer, context, 
outcome favorability/importance/severity, and informational uncertainty. With research 
questions such as these, multiple methods provide the best view of the phenomenon as a whole, 
not unlike the proverbial blind men and their perceptions of the elephant.  
Notes  
1. We are grateful to Robert Folger for his suggestions regarding this paragraph.  
2. The CRSP equal-weighted index, composed of stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ, serves as the market index. We also used the market model () to test abnormal 
movement of the price of the firm's stock and the results are qualitatively the same.  
3. As a further robustness check, we tried firms' total revenues and employment as alternative 
metrics for size, and the results are qualitatively the same.  
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